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Introduction
As our scientific theories mature, the models
and frameworks we employ approach greater clar-
ity. With this piece, I present a graphic model of
Ostrom’s (1992) The Rudiments of a Theory of the
Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-
Property Institutions in order to clarify the nature of
its theoretical components and depict in visual form
how those components interact. While Ostrom’s
work continues to inspire a great deal of theoretical
and empirical research, the 1992 piece is the most
comprehensive, yet succinct presentation of factors
influencing collective action.
Ostrom’s (1992) theory was based on a num-
ber of case studies, and it parsed the management
of common property into three states—1) institu-
tional origins, 2) survival, and 3) performance—and
sketched out qualitative cost-benefit models for each
of these states. The framework sketched out in the
1992 chapter first laid out the conditions under
which “appropriator organizations”  would arise; spe-
cifically, resource characteristics, demand vs. supply,
and characteristics of individuals forming the orga-
nization. Appropriator organizations are more likely
to survive under yet other conditions, relating largely
to rule enforcement, legitimacy supported by other
institutions, and non-rapid change. Ultimately, an
organization’s performance depends on efficiency
(sustainability and a positive benefit:cost ratio) and
equity (match between users and organization mem-
bers, positive benefit:cost ratio in operation of the
organization, and knowledge acquired about resource
and users).
There is intuitive and practical appeal to sepa-
rating out three states in the management of com-
mon property resources. An organization must be-
gin. It then must survive. And survival usually is
not sufficient—some balance between equity and
efficiency is required for long-term performance.
In order to begin to understand the relative im-
portance of various factors, I have merged all three
states in Figure 1 by combining the factors from
each of Ostrom’s states that are repeated in the
other states, yet still maintaining connections be-
tween different factors.
My motivation for combining these states into
one phase is that as researchers we each tend to deal
with our own little pieces of the common property
management puzzle and often lose site of the larger
picture. This essay is intended as a relatively holistic
reference, from which aspects can be extracted and
more fully developed while remaining aware of the
connections with other parts of the theory. For ex-
ample, a study on trust among the users of a com-
mon property resource must fit into a framework
that considers the user group institution’s own ef-
fect, or even the government’s effect, on building
trust. By presenting a graphic model as a baseline for
charting Ostrom’s multi-tier theory, I hope to make
theory of collective action more accessible for evalu-
ation. By using graphical conventions, we are forced
to have new conversations about the nature of the
factors involved and the relations between them. The
graphical conventions allow us to place the fac-
tors into a variety of compartments that represent
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Figure 1. A graphical model of Ostrom’s (1992) origins, survival, and performance of
common-property institutions.
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empirical entities (e.g., matter, energy, information,
individuals, and institutions), as well as allow us to
more clearly specify what types of flows occur be-
tween these entities. This is useful for better un-
derstanding the complexities of common-property
institutions.
Explication of the Graphical Model (Figure 1)
I attempt throughout Figure 1to maintain the
causal relationships posited by Ostrom (1992). Ex-
plication of the model is not intended to reiterate in
text that which can be seen in the figure, but to offer
some insights into potential challenges and interest-
ing questions that arose as a result of my own em-
pirical and theoretical research on collective action
problems. However, some explanation of Figure 1
(and caveats) is required.
Figure 1 is not an explicit cost-benefit analy-
sis, although decision-making costs and enforce-
ment costs are part of the model. The final outputs
of the system are “origin,” “survival,” and “perfor-
mance,” and are each located in an interaction en-
closure symbol (which allows two or more paths to
connect and produce something new). What is im-
portant to point out here is that these indeed are
Ostrom’s three original stages, and that by changing
the importance of the connections between input
components we can potentially understand a great
variety of specific milieus in which origin, survival
or performance succeed and/or fail.
The graphical language relies on symbols from
both H.T. Odum (e.g., 1983) and the Human Eco-
systems Group at the University of Georgia (e.g.,
Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology 1998).
Odum was concerned with structure, entities and
the connections between them. Here size of the com-
ponents and the thickness of lines depict their rela-
tive importance, and attempt is made to locate com-
ponents in groups based on the similarity between
components or on the amount/kinds of interaction.
See Figure 2 for a key to the symbolic language used
in the model. Please take a moment to read Figure 1.
The biggest challenge in graphically depicting
Ostrom’s (1992) chapter is deciding the nature of
each of the components. It is important to specify
whether components are physical items, sources of
energy or information, institutional structures, stor-
ages of matter or information, behaviors, individual
beliefs, etc. Since Ostrom (1992) provides the causal
linkages and the names of components, one of the
purposes of the present exercise is to examine the
functional similarities and differences between com-
ponents. For example, should the enclosure symbol
labeled “common understanding” (of resource with-
drawal) be a ‘switch’, a ‘comparator’, an ‘institutional
structure’, or ‘information storage’? “Common un-
derstanding” is not a structure (signifed in the model
by a rectangle), but perhaps it serves as information
storage (a half-circle topped by a vertex) that can be
called upon intermittently; one which slowly devel-
ops over time. It could also be considered a as a ‘com-
parator’ (rectangle with two chopped off corners) that
takes in information and compares it to what is al-
ready known in order to determine whether com-
mon understanding is possible or not. I placed the
comparator within the storage symbol, since both
characteristics seemed necessary. “Common under-
standing” then feeds into a switch, which is the level
of costs in decision-making. These designations as
graphically distinct components prompt us to think
even more carefully about which empirical obser-
vations we should focus on when constructing and
testing this particular theoretical framework. Other
symbols in this graphic might also be made into
composite functions, thus improving the clarity of
the framework.
The large enclosure symbol called “common prop-
erty resource users” is distinct from, but overlaps with,
the large enclosure symbol “common property resource
institution.” This is because there is often a mismatch
between users and owners and, in such a case, indi-
viduals are partly outside of the resource management
system. Thus, I chose to separate the individual resource
users from institutions in this depiction, in order to
recognize that institutions often have goals that do not
equal the desires of individual users.
As can be seen in the upper right hand part of
the drawing, being linked to a larger system can
provide informational and motivational resources,
including technical training and assistance with
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Figure 2. Key to human ecosystems models. From Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology (1998 vol.
2, p. 5). Based on H. T. Odum (1983, Systems Ecology, New York: John Wiley and Sons) and conventions
established by the Information Ecology Group, Department of Anthropology, University of Georgia.
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conflict management and compliance problems.
Legally, it can assure local freedom to develop ini-
tiatives, assure certainty of ownership status, and pro-
vide appropriate legal recourse.
Points of Interest
Three ‘panels’ are immediately discernible. On
the left hand side is a group of ‘users’, in which
trust and interdependence serve as two of the focal
processes. This group overlaps to some extent with
the common property management institution.
The relationship between the individual users and
the group’s overall characteristics provides the main
influence on origin. The center panel is concerned
with the practicalities of institutional needs that
influence performance, which is essentially the bal-
ance between equitable distribution of costs/ben-
efits and the efficiency of use of the common prop-
erty resource. To a lesser degree, components of
the center panel also influence the origin of a com-
mon property institution. This is an interesting
feedback process—the center panel depicts what
exists once an institution exists, but some of those
components are necessary to get an institution to-
gether. On the right is a panel concerned with ex-
ternal factors, including government, a potentially
federated system of organizational support, and
external stimuli that together provide the bulk of
the influence for survival, but also indirectly feed
through the center and left-side panels to influ-
ence origin and performance.
Figure 1 began as an exercise for me to apply my
research on the formation of new social networks and
cooperative endeavors to theory on common prop-
erty. My efforts focused on better understanding the
effect of group heterogeneity on cooperation (Jones
2002). Note that, although several characteristics of
group dynamics are included in Figure 1 (e.g., group
size, similarities, time together, asset structure, trust),
the ways that these aspects of social networks affect
each other might need to be more fully developed.
This is especially the case for the concept of trust.
Research on social relations often emphasizes
trust or concepts that have been linked to trust from
an emic or etic perspective. Most definitions of trust,
based on cross-cultural data, rely most heavily on
reliability and judiciousness. Trust, however, is prob-
ably best seen as being comprised of several processes.
First, trust often appears to have something to do
with in-group/out-group behavior. A lack of “cul-
tural antagonisms” can certainly be important in fos-
tering trust (e.g., Ostrom 1992:302-303). Ostrom
(1992) also notes that mutual trust develops through
engagement in mutually beneficial transactions over
time. Another aspect of trust relates to the ability to
to watch others’ activities or to receive information
about them through gossip. Yet other aspects rely on
power/economic status and what people can be ex-
pected to do based on the productive and political
resources available to them. This could mean that
the trust ‘switch’ may require several different kinds
of triggers, or that it is not enough to talk about trust
in the “traditional” sense.3
Another update or refinement of the theory as
presented in Figure 1 is one in which Ostrom sug-
gests that the “small, simple set of rules” in the cen-
tral panel really relies quite often on the context, such
that this institutional structure might better be called
the “smallest and simplest set of rules relevant to the
variety in the environment” (2002, personal com-
munication).
After examining all the components in the
model, a productive question is to ask why some
of them are not connected by information, energy,
or matter flows. This is an important question that
provokes new directions for inquiry. For example,
why is the storage function of “information on oth-
ers’ resource use” not linked to the comparator en-
closure symbol called “interdependence/
subtractability?” It is plausible that an individual does
not need to watch their compatriots or hear about their
activities in order to know that they are interdependent
with others. How true might this assertion be? What
is the literature on this subject? Further research on
3  This is not to say, however, that any or all of these processes are always conscious calculations by individuals.
Jones / Ostrom’s Theory of Common-Property Institutions 71Vol. 7 2003
the topic may be needed. Many interesting research
projects can result from posing such questions while
interacting with holistic models.
Many possbile ouputs are in fact missing from
Figure 1. The three outputs depicted are origin, sur-
vival and performance. Survival is not really an ex-
plicit goal/desired output of most institutions—but
both origin and performance are. These outputs are
not linked to any other system nor provide any feed-
back to other parts of the model. The exception is
that survival feeds back into trust and performance.
Ostrom’s (1992) intent was to begin to explain the
origins, survival and performance of common prop-
erty resource institutions, not show how all the com-
ponents connect to each other; however, a model ac-
counting for change over time must have feedback
loops. For example, my experience is that success
often breeds success. The statement, “Success breeds
success in common-property institutions” nonethe-
less remains a very vague notion which would have
to be elaborated to portray the kinds of components
and relationships responsible for such a phenomenon.
Conclusion
Representing Ostrom’s (1992) theoretical
framework graphically allows us to clearly see the
end states (outputs) and their causes in collective
action, while at the same time noting the relative
influence of indirect forces. For example, “distance
to resource” has an effect on both origin and perfor-
mance, but this effect is not direct. Rather, it is indi-
rect since it passes first through trust or through “info
on others’ resource use,” then through “common
understanding,” and “decision-making costs.” De-
pending on the frequency with which some of these
interactions occur, regardless of the intensity of any
single interaction, it is possible that the existence of
some small processes are responsible for the mainte-
nance of the system and even more so, at times, than
are larger, more obvious components. The power of
indirect effects produced by smaller components
of a system has been noted by many ecologists.
For example, Patten (1998) notes how the unique
properties of ecosystems derive largely from the
indirect pathways that tie together biological agents.
Most pathways are small, organized within physical
environments, but often not directly connected to
one another.
By collapsing Ostrom’s three phases into one
graphic representation, it becomes clearer why be-
haviors may self-propagate, and which factors are
most important in any given self-propagation. It also
should be noted that some factors are important early
on, but can continue to provide inputs into the sys-
tem. Our analyses of common property resource in-
stitutions should take advantage of these insights.
Of course, new research provides new compo-
nents and additional relationships for this or any
other framework. But suggesting new components
or new connections between components in Figure
1 eventually brings up the question “Is this model
meaningful, since everything looks like it can be
connected to everything?” This is a ‘can’t-see-the-
trees-for-the-forest’ question, the converse of losing
sight of the big picture. Thus, Figure 1 should serve
as a baseline and as a place from which to draw new
questions or refocus old ones. The goal need not be
to connect everything to everything, but to suggest
heuristically how the aspects we are concerned with
relate to the more general problem at hand.
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